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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner,
\ s.
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NORM SMITH,
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
•k it "k

SI'" ."ITEMED

> J R1SDICTION .'.

This case is before the Court on a wait of er

•
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IIPIIL

its decision in State v. Smith, 2003 IIT App 52, 65 P.3d 648 (Addendum A). Ihe Utah
Siipivin* i 'niiri has |ini ti IUI N
I HI pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1 Is aggravated assault a lesser included offense <A felony use of a concealed
weapon, requiring merger?
^

T

f counsel is constitutionally ineffective .;i ___i seeking a directed verdict for

• •

• iein i i•. icmJiiiu ior a new trial the appropriate remedy?

Standard of Review. On certiorari, the I'Iah Nupi am " < '"' iv\ i,M(V.i ifie deuMoi I
the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,
'"J1111 hah l ^ h i

In doing so. th(e| Court adopts the same standard ofreview used by the

court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." Id.
Merger. Whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another requiring merger
is a legal question of statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bluff
2002UT66 ? 1{37, 52P.3dl210.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (3) (1995)
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation;, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise
included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-501(2)(b) (Supp. 1995)
(b) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter,
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or
blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995)
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10 SI)! ,1ml m Subsri lion-, u') tnid
(3):
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is not a
firearm on his person or one that is readily accessible for immediate use
which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than
his residence, property, or business under his control is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a sawed-off
rifle is guilty of a second degree felony;
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of
violence as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the
offense, the person is guilty of a second degree felony.
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful
taking of protected or unprotected wildlife as defined in Title 23 from carrying
a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm with a barrel length of four inches
or greater as long as the taking of wildlife does not occur:
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of that munu ip. * ;
ordinances; or
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 41 -6-1.
Utah Code Ann, $ 76-10-523 (1995)
(1) * * *

(2) The provisions of Subsections 76-1 Q-504( I )(a), (1 )(b), and Section 7610-505 do not apply to any person to whom a permit to carry a concealed
firearm has been issued pursuant to Section 53-5-704.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Trial Proceedings. Defendant was charged with and bound over for trial on felony use
of a concealed weapon, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a peace officer
making a lawful arrest. R. 1-2, 16-17, 20-21, 26-27. Following a five-day trial, a jury
convicted defendant of all four counts as charged. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at \ 7; R. 72425; R. 933: 1156-57.

The trial court denied defendant's motions for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. R. 727-30, 745-47, 751-73, 779-80. After
undergoing a diagnostic evaluation, R. 784-87, defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen
years in prison for felony use of a concealed weapon, zero-to-five years in prison for each
aggravated assault, and six months in jail for interfering with a lawful arrest. Smith, 2003
UT App 52, at \ 7; R. 829-31. The court suspended the sentence and placed defendant on
supervised probation for 36 months, subject to a jail commitment of 60 days, the payment of
a $2,000 fine, and various other conditions. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at % 7; R. 831-33.
Direct Appeal. Defendant appealed his conviction, claiming that: (1) his aggravated
assault convictions should have merged with his concealed weapon conviction, and (2) his
trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the concealed weapon charge after the
State failed to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief that defendant did not have a concealed
firearm permit. Smith, 2003 UT App 52,fflf7, 9,12, 19, 31. 1 The court of appeals rejected
the merger claim and affirmed defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and resisting a
1

Defendant also raised three other issues on appeal, all of which were rejected by the
court ofappeals.&eSmrt/z, 2003 UT App 52, at ^^10,11,13-18,24-30. Those issues are
not before this Court on certiorari.
4

lawful arrest. Id. at fflf 19-23, 37. However, the court concluded that defendant's trial
counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not moving to dismiss the concealed weapon
charge and remanded the matter for a new trial on that charge. Id. atfflf31-35, 37.
Certiorari Review. Both defendant and the State filed petitions for a writ of certiorari.
The Court granted the State's petition and granted defendant's petition in part. See Order
(dated August 21,2003). The Court consolidated the two petitions, designating defendant as
the petitioner and cross-respondent and the State as the respondent and cross-petitioner. Id.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of April 9, 1996, defendant and his friend Clayton Call drove their
motorcycles to a piece of property in Virgin, Utah to feed defendant's horses. Smith, 2003
UT App 52, at \ 2; R. 933: 872; R. 931:713. Once there, defendant suspected that members
of a family with whom he had been feuding had stolen and vandalized personal property that
he had left on the premises. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, atf 2; R. 933: 872-73; R. 931:714-15.
Defendant and Call left to look for the missing property. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at \ 2.
While they were away, defendant retrieved a holstered pistol from the inn where he and his
family were residing and placed it around his waist. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at ^J 2; R. 933:
872-74, 881, 956-57; R. 931: 715-16. He also telephoned his wife and asked her to report
the suspected theft and vandalism to police. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at ^ 2.
The two men returned to the property and stood guard there for the next several hours.
Smith,2003 UT App 52, at If 3; R. 933: 873,963; R. 931: 717-18, 781-82. During that time,
defendant and Call retrieved ammunition and two rifles from an underground cellar and
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placed them in a partially-constructed building located on the property. R. 931: 783-84.
After a few hours, defendant left to telephone his wife and verify that she had called police.
R. 933: 877; R. 931: 720. When he returned, he spoke to a couple of neighbors, including
Ron Felton. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 3; R. 933: 1068,1076. During the conversation,
defendant declared that "the only good cop is a dead cop." R. 933: 1068. Sometime
afterwards, defendant began pacing up and down the property and throwing dirt clods at
Felton's home, prompting Felton's wife Sharon to call 9-1-1. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f
3.
Sometime afterwards, Call left in his car, but promptly returned to warn defendant
that sheriffs deputies were on their way up to the property. R. 933:959-60; R. 931: 722-24;
Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 4. Defendant untucked his shirt and pulled it over his gun to
concealit. SmzY/z,2003UTApp52,atTI4;R.933:1066-69. Within a few minutes, Deputies
Johnny Owen and Lorin Orvin of the Washington County Sheriffs Office arrived on the
scene. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at ^ 4; R. 935: 271-75, 332, 500-02. After they exited their
vehicles, Deputy Owen advised defendant that they had received a complaint he was
brandishing a weapon. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at <f| 4. When Deputy Owen asked
defendant if he had a weapon, defendant lifted his shirt to expose his pistol and placed his
hand on the butt of the gun. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at ^|4. Deputy Owen asked defendant
to surrender the gun, but defendant refused, complaining that the police always arrested him
when they responded to a complaint. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at Tf 4; R. 935: 282-84, 323;
R. 931: 524.
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Deputy Owen slowly moved toward defendant, repeatedly asking him to surrender the
gun, but defendant backed away. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 5. Defendant then turned, ran
into the partially-constructed building, and hid behind several garbage cans. Smith, 2003 UT
App 52, at ^j 5-6. After positioning themselves outside the building, the deputies urged
defendant to surrender his weapon, but he refused. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, atfflj5-6; R.
935:309,312; R. 931: 531. After threatening to shoot the deputies, defendant dropped to his
knees and pointed his gun directly at Deputy Orvin. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at \ 6. Deputy
Orvin took cover and radioed for assistance. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 6.
After several minutes of negotiation, defendant placed his gun on one of the garbage
cans and surrendered to the deputies. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at \ 6; R. 935: 313-14; R.
931:532-33. R. 935: 314; R. 931: 533.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Merger. A defendant may not be convicted of two offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode when one is a lesser included offense of the other. Traditionally, this Court
has applied a two-step analysis in determining whether one crime is a lesser included offense
of another. First, the Court compares the statutory elements of the two crimes as a
theoretical matter. And second, if necessary, the Court compares the statutory elements by
reference to the facts proved at trial. In State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990), this
Court added, in effect, a third step to merger analysis, requiring a determination of whether
the legislature intended the two offenses to stand in the relationship of greater and lesser
offenses.
Aggravated assault would be a lesser included offense of felony use of a concealed
weapon under traditional merger analysis. However, an examination of the nature and
purpose of the felony concealed weapons statute reveals that the legislature intended that the
offense be enhanced to a second degree felony and be punished in addition to the underlying
"crimes of violence."
II. Remand for New Trial. Because defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in
not moving to dismiss the concealed firearm charge, the Court need not reach defendant's
claim that double jeopardy bars a new trial on that charge. In any event, the court of appeals
correctly concluded that an ineffectiveness claim based on counsel's failure to move to
dismiss a charge is a trial error, the appropriate remedy for which is a new trial.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF FELONY USE OF A CONCEALED WEAPON
Section 76-10-504 makes it a second degree felony to use a concealed weapon during

the commission of aggravated assault or other designated "crime of violence." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (Supp. 1995) ("felony use of a concealed weapon") Following a jury
trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of felony
use of a concealed weapon. R. 724-25; R. 933: 1156-57. On appeal, defendant argued that
"aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of [felony] use of a concealed weapon and
the trial court erred by refusing to merge the two crimes." Smith, 2003 UT App 52, f 19.
Relying on State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990), the court of appeals rejected
defendant's argument, holding that "the legislature intended [felony use of a concealed
weapon] to act as an enhancement statute and thereby communicated its intent that the
underlying violent crime remain separate from the concealed weapon charge." Smith, 2003
UT App 52,fflf19-23. The court of appeals holding is correct.
A.

H I L L ' S T W O - S T E P M E R G E R ANALYSIS.

Under section 76-1-402, a defendant may not be convicted of two offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode when one is a lesser included offense of the other. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1995); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995). If the
greater crime is proven [at trial], then the lesser crime merges into it." State v. Shaffer, 725
P.2d 1301, 1313 (Utah 1986).
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In State v. Hill, 61A P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), this Court established a two-step analysis
for determining whether a greater-lesser relationship exists. The first step is a theoretical
comparison of the statutory elements of each offense, without regard to the facts of the
particular case. Hill, 61A P.2d at 97. "[W]hen proof of one crime necessarily proves all of
the elements of the second crime," the second crime is a lesser included offense and merges
with the greater. Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; accord Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 -402(3)(a)
(providing that an offense is lesser included when "[i]t is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged"). "In
most situations, this [step alone] is sufficient to determine whether a lesser included
relationship exists between crimes." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861.
A second step of analysis is required where a crime has multiple variations so that
"two crimes would be separate under one set of circumstances but lesser included offenses
under another set of circumstances." Id/, accord Hill, 61A P.2d at 97. In that case, "[t]he
court must look at the evidence actually presented at trial to determine which of the statutory
variations were proved and whether those variations created a lesser included relationship
between the two charged crimes." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; accord Hill, 61A P.2d at 97. If
so, the lesser included offense merges with the greater. See Hill, 61A P.2d at 97-98.
B.

M C C O V E Y ' S THREE-STEP M E R G E R ANALYSIS.

In State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990), this Court revisited Hill's two-step
merger analysis and added, in effect, a third step. In that case, a jury convicted the defendant
of felony murder and aggravated robbery. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1234. The trial court
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denied defendant's motion to merge the two convictions and defendant appealed. Id. at
1234-35. He argued that aggravated robbery, as a predicate offense to felony murder, is a
lesser included offense of felony murder, requiring merger. Id. at 1235. This Court rejected
defendant's claim. Id. at 1239.
Following the two-step analysis established in Hill, the McCovey court first compared
the statutory elements of the two crimes as a theoretical matter and then compared the crimes
by reference to the facts proved at trial. See id. at 1236 (citing Hill, 61A P.2d at 97). The
Court concluded that under a "strict theoretical comparison," aggravated robbery qualifies as
a lesser included offense of felony murder because a conviction for felony murder requires
"pro[of] that the murder was committed during the commission, attempted commission, or
flight from the commission or attempted commission of [one of the designated] felon[ies],"
aggravated robbery among them. Id. at 1237. The Court likewise concluded that aggravated
robbery qualified as a lesser included offense under the facts proved at trial, noting that the
factual basis for the felony murder conviction was that the murder took place during the
commission of the aggravated robbery. Id.
After applying this two-step review, the Court acknowledged that "aggravated
robbery would be a lesser included offense of felony murder" under the Hill analysis. Id. at
1237. The Court did not, however, stop there, but identified a third step in determining
whether a greater-lesser relationship exists between offenses.

The Court held that

"resolution of the issue requires a determination of whether the legislature intended [the
predicate offense] to be a lesser included offense . . . . " Id. at 1235. After examining the
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nature and purpose of the felony murder statute, the Court concluded that "the Utah State
Legislature did not intend the multiple crimes of felony murder to be punished as a single
crime, but rather, that the homicide be enhanced Xo second degree felony murder in addition
to the underlying felony. Id. at 1239 (emphasis added).
In determining legislative intent, the Court first examined the nature of the felony
murder statute. Id. at 1237-38. The Court "recognize[d] that enhancement statutes are
different in nature than other criminal statutes," predicated on crimes that are typically
unrelated to the primary offense. Id. at 1237. The Court noted that while theft, by its very
nature, has overlapping elements with aggravated robbery, "[aggravated robbery does not,
by its nature, have overlapping elements with any traditional form of murder." Id. The
Court thus observed that "the only reason aggravated robbery is encompassed within the
definition of lesser included offense of felony murder is that the legislature designated it as
an enhancing offense." Id. The Court intimated that enhancement statutes of this nature are
generally indicative of a legislative intent to punish both the enhanced offense and the
predicate crime. See id. at 1239.
The McCovey court acknowledged that its decision was seemingly in conflict with
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), which held that the predicate crimes to first
degree felony murder are lesser included offenses.

McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237-38.

However, the Court distinguished first and second degree felony murder by reference to their
respective punishments. Id. at 1238. In the case of first degree felony murder, imposing a
punishment for the predicate offense would add nothing to the punishment because first
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degree felony murder is punishable by death or life imprisonment. Id. at 1238. In contrast,
the Court observed that imposing punishment for the predicate offense to second degree
felony murder "would not be needless or surplusage" because second degree felony murder
carries a punishment of only five years to life. Id.
McCovey next "considered] the . . . purpose of the felony murder statute." Id. at
1238. In concluding that the predicate crimes to felony murder are not lesser included
offenses, the Court focused on the statute's purpose "to deter the use offeree or weapons in
the commission of a felony." Id. The Court reasoned:
If a felon knows that a homicide committed during the commission of a
felony, whether accidental or unintentional, will be treated as a first degree
felony in addition to the underlying felony being committed, he or she will be
less apt to use deadly force or dangerous weapons. Conversely, if the
legislature intended to make the underlying felony a lesser included offense,
then a felon could receive a two-for-one windfall by convincing the jury that
the homicide was unintentional or accidental.
Id. at 1239. The Court concluded that the legislature could not have intended to create such
a windfall. Id.

McCovey also noted that the victim of the robbery was the video store and the victim
of the murder was a customer, whereas in Shaffer the victim of the robbery and the victim of
the murder were the same person. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 123 8. However, as later explained
in State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 63, 37 P.3d 1073, this Court "did not base [its]
interpretation of the felony murder statute on that distinction," but "explicitly premised [its]
holding on the legislature's intent in enacting the statute."
McCovey observed that another purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is "to allow
the State to obtain a second degree murder conviction without proving any form of mens rea,
or mental state" with respect to the homicide. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238.
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C.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT DOES NOT MERGE WITH FELONY USE OF A
CONCEALED WEAPON.

The court of appeals in this case correctly applied McCovey 's three-step merger
analysis in concluding that aggravated assault does not merge with felony use of a concealed
weapon. See Smith, 2003 UT App 52, atffif19-23.
1. Theoretical and Factual Comparison of the Elements (Steps 1 & 2)
A conviction for felony use of a concealed weapon requires proof that defendant
(1) carried a concealed weapon, and (2) used that weapon during the commission of a "crime
of violence," in this case aggravated assault. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-50 l(2)(b) & 7610-504(3). As a purely theoretical matter, therefore, aggravated assault qualifies as a lesser
included offense of felony use of a concealed weapon. A factual comparison of the evidence
at trial leads to the same conclusion. Evidence at trial established that defendant carried a
concealed firearm and used that firearm in the course of an aggravated assault on each of the
two police officers. SeeR. 935:281-82,309-11,323; R. 933:1066-69; R. 931: 520-21,531,
544; Smith, 2003 UT App 52,ffl[4, 6. Having introduced that evidence, no additional facts
or separate elements were required to prove aggravated assault.
Aggravated assault, therefore, has "the same or less than all" of the elements of felony
use of a concealed weapon under both a theoretical and factual comparison of the crimes.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a). Under the traditional merger analysis established in
Hill, aggravated assault would be a lesser included offense of felony use of a concealed
weapon. See Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 20. As in McCovey, however, resolution of the
issue is not reached simply by a comparison of the elements under the Hill analysis, but
14

"requires a determination of whether the legislature intended [aggravated assault] to be a
lesser included offense of [felony use of a concealed weapon]." See McCovey, 803 P.2d at
1235.
2. Legislative Intent (Step 3).
To determine legislative intent, this Court considers the "nature and purpose" of the
concealed weapons statute. See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238. An examination of the statute's
nature and purpose demonstrates that the predicate crimes were intended by the legislature to
"remain separate from the concealed weapon charge." Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 22.
Like felony murder and its predicate offenses, a true lesser included relationship does
not exist between felony use of a concealed weapon and its predicate offenses. Just as
"[aggravated robbery does not, by its nature, have overlapping elements with any traditional
form of murder," McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237, aggravated assault does not, by its nature,
have overlapping elements with any traditional form of carrying a concealed weapon. "[T]he
only reason [aggravated assault] is encompassed within the definition of lesser included
offense of [carrying a concealed weapon] is that the legislature designated it as an enhancing
offense." See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237 (referring to aggravated robbery and felony
murder).
Section 76-10-504 makes it a misdemeanor offense for a person to carry a concealed
firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(l)(b) (Supp. 1995). The statute enhances the
misdemeanor offense to a second degree felony "[i]f the concealed firearm is used in the
commission of a crime of violence as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party
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to the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (Supp. 1995). Therefore, like the felony
murder statute considered in McCovey, felony use of a concealed weapon is an enhancement
statute, "different in nature than other criminal statutes." See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237.
Moreover, the general purpose of the concealed weapons statute "is to protect the
public by preventing an individual from having on hand a weapon of which the public is
unaware and which the individual might use should he be so inclined." State v. Williams,
636P.2d 1092,1094 (Utah 1981). A concealed weapon may pose varying degrees of danger
depending on the circumstances.

Undoubtedly recognizing this fact, the legislature

designated three different levels of punishment depending on the risk posed by the
circumstances. Carrying a concealed firearm that contains no ammunition is a class B
misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(l)(b). Carrying a concealed firearm that
contains ammunition, which represents a greater danger to the public, is a class A
misdemeanor. Id. The penalty increases to a second degree felony if the concealed weapon
is actually used during the commission of a crime of violence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10504(3).
As observed by the court of appeals, the statute's "graduated punishment scale is
indicative of an enhancement statute." Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 22. As with felony
murder, see McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238, the legislature did not thus envision any lesser
punishment for the predicate offenses. It simply sought to deter the more dangerous conduct
by imposing a more severe punishment.

16

That the legislature did not intend aggravated assault to be a lesser included offense
becomes apparent when the list of offenses that qualify as an aggravator under the statute is
considered. Like aggravated assault, most of the predicate offenses under the statute impose
punishments that are equal to or lighter than that imposed for felony use of a concealed
weapon (a second degree felony).4 However, murder and rape are both first degree felonies
and aggravated murder is a capital offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1995); & Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1996). If, as
defendant suggests, the aggravating crimes for felony use of a concealed weapon are lesser
included offenses, then not only would aggravated assault merge, but so would the more
serious offenses of rape, murder, and aggravated murder. The legislature did not intend such
a result, but intended to punish the underlying felony as well. See Smith, 2003 UT App 52,
atT[23.
* * *

In summary, reason dictates that the legislature did not intend that felony use of a
concealed weapon and its predicate crimes be punished as a single offense, but rather, that
the concealed weapon offense be enhanced to a second degree felony in addition to the
underlying felony. Cf. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1239) (using similar language in the context of
second degree felony murder). The court of appeals, therefore, correctly concluded that "the

4

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995) (manslaughter), Utah Code Ann. § 765-105 (1995) (mayhem), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995) (kidnapping), Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-301 (Supp. 1995) (robbery), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) (burglary), and Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995) (extortion).
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legislature intended section 76-10-504 to act as an enhancement statute and thereby
communicated its intent that the underlying violent crime remain separate from the
concealed weapon charge." Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 23. 5
II.

BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE, THIS
COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT A NEW
TRIAL IS BARRED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY; IN ANY EVENT, THE
REMEDY FOR A SUCCESSFUL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL CLAIM IS A NEW TRIAL
On appeal, defendant argued that his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective for

not moving to dismiss the concealed weapon charge because the State rested without
introducing any evidence that defendant did not have a concealed firearm permit. Aplt. Brf.
at 31-32, 35. The court of appeals agreed and remanded for a new trial on the concealed
weapon offense. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 3 5 & n. 8. On certiorari, defendant argues that
double jeopardy bars a retrial because the reversal was, in effect, for insufficient evidence,
not trial error. Cert. Brf. at 20-22.
This Court need not reach this issue. As explained in the State's Brief of CrossPetitioner, infra, at 23-27 (point I), lack of a concealed firearm permit is not an element of
the concealed weapons offense. As a result, any motion to dismiss would have been futile.
See Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101,1109 (Utah 1983) (holding that counsel's failure to

5

Even if this Court were to conclude that an aggravated assault conviction merges
with a second degree felony concealed weapons conviction, only one of the two aggravated
assault convictions would merge. See State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90 (Utah 1993)
(observing that "it makes no sense... to merge both convictions when the law requires only
one predicate offense"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144
(Utah 1996).
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make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective
assistance).
In any event, the court of appeals correctly concluded that defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is "trial error," not of insufficiency of the evidence. Smith, 2003
UT App 52, at ^f 35 n.8. As observed by the court of appeals, defendant did not make an
insufficiency of the evidence claim based on the State's failure to introduce evidence that he
did not have a concealed firearm permit. Id. at \ 24 n.4. Indeed, he could not do so because
defendant admitted on cross-examination that he did not have a concealed firearm permit. R.
933: 961; Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at \ 24 n.4. In judging the sufficiency of evidence, "this
Court views all of the evidence presented at trial," State v. Gardner, 131 P.2d 183,194 (Utah
1987), not just that presented in the State's case in chief.
As correctly held by the court of appeals, the error complained of here goes instead to
counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. See Smith,
2003 UT App 52, at ^j 35 n.8. As such, the outcome of the trial, even had counsel moved for
a directed verdict, is far from certain. Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that "the court may issue an order dismissing [a charge] upon the ground that the
evidence is not legally sufficient...." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(p) (emphasis added). The trial
court is not required to do so if the case is reopened and the missing evidence is introduced.
Faced with a motion for a directed verdict, the prosecutor "might properly and with little
difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence." State v. Lawrence, 120
Utah 2d 323, 326, 234 P.2d 600, 601 (1951). Counsel's alleged error, therefore, is not an
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error in judgment concerning the quantum of evidence needed to convict as argued by
defendant, see Cert. Brf. at 22, but rather an error in the trial process as stated by the court of
appeals. See Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at «f 35 n.8.
Almost without exception, the remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel is remand
for a new trial. See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 37, 984 P.2d 376 (remanding for
new trial after concluding that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cautionary
eyewitness instruction); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,361 (Utah App. 1993) (remanding for
new trial after concluding that defendant's counsel was ineffective for failing to move for
suppression of defendant's statements to police); State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah
1991) (remanding for new trial after concluding that counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to prosecutor's reference to defendant's silence). This is so because although
counsel's error created "a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different," State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995), that outcome is not
inevitable. As discussed above, this case is no different.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals on the issues of merger and remand for a new trial.

(go to next page for Brief of Cross-Petitioner)
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 20030341-SC

NORM SMITH,
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.
BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER
* * *

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES6
1. Does section 76-10-504 require the State to prove, as an element of the offense,
that the defendant did not have a valid concealed firearm permit?
Standard of Review.

The Supreme Court "review[s] the court of appeals's

interpretation of a statute for correctness and give[s] no deference to its conclusions of law."
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, If 5, 31 P.3d 528.
2. Did the court of appeals impermissibly shift to the State the burden of establishing
no prejudice in defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim?
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first
time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162.

6

For a Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement of Case, Statement of Facts, and relevant
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules, see Brief of Respondent, supra, at 1-7.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Concealed Firearm Permit The court of appeals held that lack of a concealed
firearm permit is an element of felony use of a concealed firearm. Based on that conclusion,
the court of appeals held that defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
because he did not seek dismissal after the State rested without introducing evidence that
defendant did not have a concealed firearm permit.
The court of appeals's ineffectiveness finding is not correct because lack of a
concealed firearm permit is not an element of the offense. Section 76-10-523 exempts
permit holders from application of the misdemeanor concealed weapons offenses. However,
it does not exempt permit holders from the proscription against felony use of a concealed
weapon. Therefore, lack of a permit cannot be an element of that offense. Neither is lack of
a permit an element of the misdemeanor offenses. The exemptions operate instead as
affirmative defenses.
II. Prejudice. The court of appeals held that defendant was prejudiced by his
attorney's failure to move for a directed verdict, even though the prosecutor could have, with
little difficulty, moved to reopen the case and supply the missing evidence. Contrary to the
court of appeals holding, the State was not required to show that the trial court would have
"necessarily" allowed it to reopen the case. Such a requirement effectively and improperly
shifts to the State the burden of proving prejudice. Under the correct standard, the record did
not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the trial court would have denied a motion to
reopen the case. All parties understood that defendant was not claiming he had a permit.
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ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT MOVING FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT BECAUSE SECTION 76-10-504 DOES NOT
REQUIRE THE STATE TO PROVE, AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE, THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A VALID
CONCEALED FIREARM PERMIT
The court of appeals held that "[p]ursuant to section 76-10-504(l)(b)..., the State

was required to prove that [defendant] did not have a valid permit to carry a concealed
weapon." Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f 32, The court of appeals concluded that because the
State had provided no evidence in its case-in-chief "to satisfy this necessary element of the
offense," defendant would have been entitled to a dismissal and that trial counsel was
therefore ineffective in not moving for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. Id.
atffif32-35 (emphasis added). Contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, proof that
defendant did not have a valid concealed firearm permit is not an element of the concealed
weapons offense. Therefore, counsel was not deficient in failing to move for a directed
verdict.
Section 76-10-504 provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and
(3):
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of
violence . . . and the person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a
second degree felony.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(l)(b), (3) (1995).
If read in isolation, without reference to other provisions governing the use of
concealed firearms, section 76-10-504 appears to make proof of no valid permit an element
of the crime—whether it is a class B misdemeanor, a class A misdemeanor, or a second
degree felony. However, the law is well-settled that in interpreting a statute, "the plain
language of [the] statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony
with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related
chapters." State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, % 8, 63 P.3d 667. When section 76-10-504 is
read in conjunction with section 76-10-523, it becomes apparent that lack of a valid permit is
not an element of the concealed weapons offense—in any of its variations.
Section 76-10-523, as it read in 1996, provided in relevant part as follows:
76-10-523. Persons exempt from weapons laws.
Q\ * * *
(2) The provisions of Subsections 76-10-504(1 )(a), (l)(b), and Section 7610-505 do not apply to any person to whom a permit to carry a concealed
firearm has been issued pursuant to Section 53-5-704.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-523(2) (1995). As its title suggests, section 76-10-523 identifies
persons that are "exempt" from the proscriptions of the concealed weapons laws.7 See State
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997) (holding that Court may consider title of a

Section 76-10-523(2) has twice been amended since 1996 and now exempts from the
specified concealed weapons laws not only persons with a valid concealed firearm permit
issued by the State of Utah under section 53-5-704, but also persons with a concealed firearm
permit issued "by another state or county." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-523(2) (Supp. 2002).
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statute to clarify its meaning so long as it does not contradict the plain intent of the statute or
create an ambiguity when the statute is otherwise clear). Permit holders that carry a
concealed firearm, whether or not it contains ammunition, are exempt. Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-504(l)(b). On the other hand, the statute does not exempt permit holders that carry a
concealed sawed-off shotgun or rifle or who use the firearm in the commission of a crime of
violence, as in this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-523(2) (making no reference to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-10-504(2) or 76-10-504(3)).
Where section 76-10-523 does not exempt permit holders from the proscription
against felony use of a concealed firearm, section 76-10-504 cannot be read to make lack of a
valid permit an element of the offense.

To do so would render section 76-10-523

inoperative. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 52, 63 P.3d 621 (holding that the Court
avoids interpretations that would render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative).
Moreover, exemptions like those identified in section 76-10-523 have traditionally
been regarded in the criminal law as affirmative defenses. For example, the securities
exemptions under section 61-1-14 have been treated by this Court as affirmative defenses.
See State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992). Other states have likewise treated
exemptions or exceptions as affirmative defenses. See} e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 361
N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (Mass. 1977) (holding that possession of a valid license "brings the
defendant within an exception to the general prohibition against carrying a firearm, and is an
affirmative defense"); Royal v. State, 784 So.2d 1210,1212 (Fla. App. 2001) (holding that
defendant must raise claim that business falls within one of the exceptions to the statute);
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State v. Bowdry, 337 N.W.2d 216,218-19 (Iowa 1983) (concluding that "where no demand
for a permit is made at the scene and no permit is produced there or at trial, the issue of a
permit is not in the case unless substantial evidence appears in the record from some
quarter—that the person had a valid permit at the time"); but see State v. Vazquez-Rubio, 917
P.2d 494 (Ore. 1996) (rejecting assertion that drug distribution exceptions are affirmative
defenses).
By specifically identifying "[p]ersons exempt from weapons laws," Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-523 (title), the legislature expressed its intent that possession of a concealed firearm
permit operate as an affirmative defense. The affirmative defense that one has a valid permit
is not unlike other statutorily-defmed affirmative defenses. In each case, the statutorily
defined affirmative defenses identify persons that are "justified" in committing the otherwise
unlawful acts and who are thus exempt from application of the law. See, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-2-401 to -406 (1999). In these circumstances, the State is not required to
establish that the defendant was not justified in committing the violation unless the defendant
has adequately raised the defense. See State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986). Only
then is the State required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the affirmative
defense. Id.
In addition, requiring the State to prove that defendant did not have a valid permit
"would force the prosecution to prove a negative . . . , a burden the law does not often
impose." State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985). The ramifications of such a
requirement are compounded in light of the amendments made to section 76-10-523 since
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defendant's crime. Not only are persons with a valid Utah concealed firearm permit exempt
from application of the law, but so too are persons with a valid permit issued "by another
state or county." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-523(2) (Supp. 2002). If this Court allows the
holding of the court of appeals to stand, the State will not only bear the burden of proving the
absence of a valid Utah permit, but also the impossible burden of proving that a defendant
does not have a valid permit from another state or county. Nothing suggests that the
legislature intended to impose such a Herculean burden.
* * *

Because no basis existed for lack of evidence that defendant did not have a valid
permit, trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in failing to move for a directed
verdict on that ground. See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109 (holding that counsel's failure to
make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective
assistance). The court of appeals's holding that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective
should therefore be reversed.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPERMISSIBLY SHIFTED TO THE
STATE THE BURDEN OF PROVING NO PREJUDICE IN AN
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
Because defendant's trial counsel did not perform deficiently, there can be no

prejudice. This Court should nevertheless address the court of appeals's treatment of
prejudice because its decision, in effect, impermissibly shifts the burden to the State of
showing prejudice.
* * *
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As acknowledged by the court of appeals, Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at <f| 31, this Court
has recognized that "[t]o show ineffective assistance of counsel, 'a defendant must show (1)
that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." Wickham v. Galetka,
2002 UT 72, \ 19, 61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995));
accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984).
In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, the United States Supreme Court
observed that "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." Accordingly, when defendant challenges his attorney's failure to move for
a directed verdict for insufficient evidence, he must demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood"
that, absent such failure, the trial court would have denied a State's motion to reopen its case
and would have instead granted the motion for a directed verdict. See State v. MedinaJuarez, 2001 UT 79, ^ 16, 34 P.3d 187; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at
2068-69.
The court of appeals, however, impermissibly shifted to the State the burden of
demonstrating no prejudice by implicitly requiring a showing that the trial court would have
"necessarily" granted a motion to reopen the case. In finding prejudice, the court of appeals
concluded that it was "not convinced that the trial court would have necessarily allowed the
State to reopen its case and supply the missing evidence." Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at ^135
(emphasis added). However, the State is not required to show that the trial court would have
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"necessarily" allowed it to reopen its case. Rather, as stated above, defendant is required to
show a reasonable likelihood that the trial court would not have allowed the prosecution to
reopen the case and supply the missing evidence. That showing was not made.
Although the trial court has no obligation to allow the State to reopen its case, this
Court has held that where the State faces a directed verdict motion for failure to introduce
evidence of an element of the crime, the prosecutor "might properly and with little difficulty
have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence." Lawrence, 120 Utah 2d at 326,
234 P.2d at 601. On direct appeal, defendant pointed to nothing in the record, nor in the case
law, that suggested any likelihood that the court would have denied a State's motion to
reopen the case to supply the missing evidence. Indeed, the record suggests the contrary.
As observed by the court of appeals, defendant admitted during his defense that he did
not have and never has had a concealed firearm permit. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at Tf 24 n.4;
R. 933: 961. That testimony was consistent with defendant's position throughout the
proceedings. See, e.g., R. 297 (alleging that no permit was required to possess a firearm on
place of residence or business); R. 332 (same); R. 486 (same); R. 513-14 (contending that it
is legal to carry a concealed firearm at your residence, property, or business and
summarizing the State's burden as threefold: (1) that the firearm was concealed, (2) that a
crime was committed before defendant exposed the firearm, and (3) that the firearm was
exposed "from a hiding place to a position of assault at the very moment of exposure").
Because defendant had implicitly admitted to not having the permit, the State reasonably
assumed that the matter was not disputed. See Lawrence, 120 Utah at 327,234 P.2d at 601
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(in holding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice regarding the value of the stolen
car, the Court observed that it "was not a case where the defendant either expressly or
impliedly admitted the value, nor by conduct or statements of himself or counsel, allowed it
to be assumed that the matter was not disputed").
Had defendant suddenly disputed that fact by filing a motion for a directed verdict,
that motion would have inevitably been followed by a motion to reopen the case to introduce
evidence that defendant did not have the required permit. It is not reasonably likely that the
trial court would have denied that motion. See Lawrence, 120 Utah 2d at 326, 234 P.2d at
601.
In summary, by requiring a showing that the trial court would have "necessarily
allowed the State to reopen its case and supply the missing evidence," Smith, 2003 UT App
52, at \ 35, the court of appeals impermissibly shifted the prejudice burden from the
defendant to the State in contradiction to Strickland. Under the appropriate standard,
defendant failed to show the necessary prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals holding that defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in not moving for a directed verdict based on the State's failure to introduce
evidence that defendant did not have a valid concealed firearm permit. See Smith, 2003 UT
App 52, at ^ 3 1 - 3 5 , 37.
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THORNE, Judge:
1[l
Norm Smith appeals from convictions for using a concealed
weapon in the commission of a crime of violence, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (1995), and
two counts of aggravated assault, both third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995). We affirm in part
and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND1
^[2
On the morning of April 9, 1996, Smith and his friend
Clayton Call drove to Smith's property in Virgin, Utah. Once
there, Smith suspected that someone had vandalized or stolen some
1. "'On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict and present conflicting
evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised on
appeal. !M State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1(2, 52 P. 3d 1210 (quoting
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,^2, 40 P.3d 611), cert denied, 2003
U.S. Lexis 935, 71 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003).

of his personal property. Both men left to look for Smith's
missing property. Smith retrieved a holstered pistol from his
residence and placed it around his waist. Smith then telephoned
his wife and told her to report the suspected theft and
vandalism.
13
Both men returned to the property, where Smith spoke to his
neighbors, Ron and Sharon Felton. Afterwards, for reasons not
clear from the record, Smith began pacing up and down the
property and throwing dirt clods at the Felton!s home, prompting
Sharon Felton to call 911.
^[4
Eventually, Call left, but returned to warn Smith that two
sheriff cars were heading toward the property. Shortly before
Deputies Johnny Owen and Lorin Orvin arrived, Sharon Felton
observed Smith pull his shirt down, covering the pistol. After
the two deputies exited their vehicles, Deputy Owen advised Smith
that they had received a complaint that he was brandishing a
weapon. When Deputy Owen asked Smith if he had a weapon, Smith
lifted up his shirt to expose his pistol and placed his hand on
the butt of the gun. Deputy Owen asked Smith to surrender the
gun, but Smith refused.
H5
Deputy Owen slowly moved toward Smith and repeatedly asked
him to surrender the gun. Smith backed away, turned, ran, and
hid in a partially-constructed building on the property. The
deputies pursued him, positioning themselves outside two separate
windows.
H6
Once in the building, Smith attempted to conceal himself
behind several garbage cans. The deputies urged Smith to
surrender his weapon. When Smith responded that he could shoot
the deputies, Deputy Orvin told Smith that although he may very
well shoot one of them, the other would shoot Smith before he
could shoot them both. Smith then dropped to his knees and
pointed his pistol directly at Deputy Orvin. Deputy Orvin took
cover and radioed for assistance.
1(7
After several minutes of negotiation, Smith surrendered, and
was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a
lawful arrest. A jury convicted Smith on each count. The trial
court suspended prison terms of one to fifteen years on the
second-degree felony and zero to five years on each aggravated
assault charge. The court also sentenced Smith to serve 60 days
in the county jail, pay $2,000 in fines, $3 00 in costs, and serve
3 6 months probation. Smith now appeals.

o

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
i[8
Smith first argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to call witnesses and to confront the witnesses against
him. When reviewing a trial court's decision not to allow a
defendant to call a witness or to limit the cross-examination of
a witness, we "review the legal rule applied for correctness and
the application of the rule to the facts of the case for an abuse
of discretion." State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9,fl7, 41 P.3d
1137.
1(9
Smith next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
merge the aggravated assault charges with the concealed weapon
charge. "Merger issues present questions of law, which we review
for correctness." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,^10, 55 P.3d
1131, cert denied, 2003 Utah Lexis 4 (Utah Jan. 13, 2003).
UlO Smith next argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in the
second degree. "In considering an insufficiency-of-evidence
claim, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the verdict."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993).
Ull Smith also argues that the trial court committed plain error
in failing to instruct the jury that threatening with a dangerous
weapon is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. To
establish plain error, Smith must show that: "(i) an error was
made; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the
error, a more favorable outcome was reasonably likely." State v.
Helmick, 2000 UT 70,^9, 9 P.3d 164.
1|l2 Finally, Smith argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. We review this claim as a matter of law.
See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32,^20, 984 P.2d 376.
ANALYSIS
I. Right to Call and Confront Witnesses
Ul3 Smith first asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to call a witness when the trial court denied his request
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to call Ron Felton.2 To establish a violation of his
constitutional right to call a witness, "a criminal defendant
. . . must make some possible showing that the testimony of the
absent witness 'would have been both material and favorable to
his defense.'" State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 274 (Utah 1985)
(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873,
102 S. Ct. 3440, 3449 (1982)). "Testimony is material, and its
exclusion therefore prejudicial, if there is a reasonable
probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the
trial." Id. at 275.
fl4 Here, Smith asked to call Ron Felton as a witness. Smith
had spoken with Ron Felton several hours before the deputies
arrived and Smith alleged that Ron Felton would have testified
that Smith had been calm during that conversation. Smith argued
that Ron Felton's testimony was necessary to rebut testimony that
he was agitated and excited when the deputies first arrived at
the property. The trial court excluded Ron Felton's testimony
because it found the testimony to be too attenuated from the
encounter with the deputies to be relevant or material.
fl5 Smith's demeanor hours before the deputies arrived has no
bearing on whether he, in fact, carried a concealed weapon,
assaulted the deputies, or interfered with a lawful arrest hours
later. Furthermore, Smith's own witness, Call, testified that
immediately before and during the incident, Smith was angry and
agitated. Smith also acknowledged, in his own testimony, that he
was "irritated" with the sheriff's office and its deputies. In
light of the testimony of both Smith and Call, and the
intervening time lapse, it is extremely unlikely that Ron
Felton's testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial.
Thus, the testimony was not sufficiently relevant or material and
the trial court did not violate Smith's Sixth Amendment rights
when it excluded the testimony.
^16 Smith next argues that the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him when the
trial court limited his cross-examination of Deputy Orvin. This
court has held that trial judges may impose reasonable limits on

2. At trial, Smith sought to call Ron Felton to rebut Deputy
Owen's testimony that Smith had been agitated during his
encounter with the deputies. The trial court found the evidence
too attenuated to be relevant and denied Smith's request. In
contrast, on appeal Smith argues that Ron Felton's testimony was
relevant to rebut Sharon Felton's testimony. However, Smith did
not renew his request to call Ron Felton after Sharon Felton
testified and does not argue plain error on appeal. Thus, we
review only the trial court's ruling that Ron Felton's testimony
was too attenuated to be relevant.

A

cross-examination if interrogation is "'repetitive or only
marginally relevant.'" Chavez, 2002 UT App 9 at 1Jl9 (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435
(1986)).
1|l7 It is within the trial court's permitted range of discretion
to limit cross-examination on matters which are either marginally
relevant or pointlessly repetitive. See id. Here, prior to
cross-examination, Deputy Orvin .testified for approximately
thirty-four minutes over the course of two days. Smith then
cross-examined him for approximately fifty minutes before the
trial court ordered a recess. During that recess, the court
advised Smith that he was imposing a thirty-minute time limit on
the remainder of Smith's cross-examination because the court
believed that Smith was "straying off into the minutiae." After
thirty minutes of additional cross-examination, the court
informed Smith that he had reached his time limit. However, upon
Smith's request, the court allowed him to continue asking
questions regarding his surrender. When it became obvious that
the cross-examination was no longer relevant, the trial court
directed Smith to stop.
^18 Thus, Smith was given over eighty minutes to cross-examine
Deputy Orvin. Smith chose to use this time to question Deputy
Orvin about such things as the location of the deputies' cars,
the type of animals on the property, the characteristics of the
fence, and other matters irrelevant to the proceedings. A
defendant is not entitled to an unlimited or pointless
examination of witnesses. See generally id. After reviewing the
record, we conclude that the trial court's limitation did not
prevent Smith from eliciting testimony necessary to his defense.
The trial court simply restricted Smith from questioning the
witness about matters which were only marginally relevant or that
were pointlessly repetitive of earlier testimony. Thus, Smith
was given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Orvin
and his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him
was not violated.
II. Merger of Lesser Included Offense
fl9 Smith next argues that aggravated assault is a lesser
included offense of second-degree use of a concealed weapon and
the trial court erred by refusing to merge the two crimes.3
"Merger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect
criminal defendants from being twice punished for committing a
single act that may violate more than one criminal statute."
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,^17, 55 P.3d 1131. This principle

3. Smith preserved this issue by raising it in a pretrial
motion.
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has been codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999), which
provides that "[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both
the offense charged and the included offense."
H2 0 Here, to convict Smith of carrying a concealed weapon in the
second-degree, the State had to prove that Smith used a concealed
weapon in the commission of a "crime of violence," in this case
aggravated assault. Utah Code Ann: § 76-10-504(3) (1995).
Accordingly, to convict Smith of a second degree felony the State
had to prove each and every element of aggravated assault plus
the elements of the weapon charge. Consequently, the thirddegree aggravated assault was "established by proof of the same
or less than all of the facts required to establish" the seconddegree weapons offense. Utah Code Ann § 76-1-402(3) (a) .
Pursuant to a traditional merger analysis, the underlying
aggravated assault charges should merge into the second-degree
felony. See, e.g.. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,fl6, 994 P.2d
1243 (noting "the inquiry of whether one crime is a lesser
included offense of a greater crime under section 76-1-402, [and
merges therein] turns on the statutorily defined elements of the
two crimes").
^[21 To counter Smith ! s contention that the crimes should merge,
the State relies upon the reasoning found in State v. McCovey,
803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). In McCovey, the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that an underlying felony did not merge into a felony
murder charge. See id. at 123 9. Central to the court f s
conclusion was its determination that the felony murder statute
was an enhancement statute. See id. at 123 8-3 9. The court
stated that "enhancement statutes are different in nature than
other criminal statutes." Id. at 1237. By creating an
enhancement statute the legislature communicated its intent that
underlying crimes not merge with the specific enhanced crime.
See generally id. at 1239; see also State v. Bisner, 2001 UT
99,1163, 37 P. 3d 1073 (noting the court in McCovey "explicitly
premised [its] holding [not to merge] on the legislature's
intent").
1(22 After considering Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 in light of
McCovey, we agree with the State and conclude that it is most
properly characterized as an enhancement statute to which the
legislature did not intend merger to apply. The legislature
determined that "[i]f the concealed firearm is used in the
commission of a crime of violence as defined in [s]ection
76-1-501, and the person is a party to the offense" then the
concealed weapon offense is enhanced to a second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3). The penalties imposed by section
76-10-504 increase proportionally to the increased risk to the
public, and this graduated punishment scale is indicative of an
enhancement statute. Moreover, "[i]t is the prerogative of the

legislature to prescribe the punishment for crimes. Included
therein is the authority to increase the degree of crime, where
instruments of violence, such as explosives or firearms are
used." State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95 (Utah 1978) (footnote
omitted).
if23 We conclude that the legislature intended section 76-10-504
to act as an enhancement statute and thereby communicated its
intent that the underlying violent crime remain separate from the
concealed weapon charge. Thus, we conclude that Smith's claim
that his aggravated assault charges should have merged with the
concealed weapon charge is without merit.
III. Insufficiency of the Evidence
1(24
Smith claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the jury's verdict that he used a concealed firearm in the
commission of a crime of violence.4 Smith asserts that the State
failed to meet its burden of proof in showing that he "knowingly
and intentionally" concealed the firearm. However, section 7610-504(3) does not specify a culpable mental state. Thus,
contrary to Smith's argument, the State was not required to prove
intent or knowledge; rather, if the evidence was sufficient to
show that Smith's conduct was reckless, the State has met its
burden. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999) (noting when an
offense is not a strict liability offense and does not specify a
culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall
suffice to establish criminal responsibility").
^25 Here, the State presented evidence that Smith picked up a
holstered pistol at his residence and put it around his waist.
The State also presented evidence that just before the deputies
arrived at the property, Smith untucked his shirt so that it
obscured the pistol from view. The deputies testified that upon
arriving at the property, they did not see the pistol and had to
question Smith about its existence. Upon admitting that he had a
pistol, Smith had to raise his shirt to reveal it. This is
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have
determined that Smith recklessly or intentionally concealed the
pistol.
4. Smith later argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to request a directed verdict on his concealed
weapon charge when the State presented no evidence that Smith did
not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Smith, however,
does not argue this as a basis for finding the evidence
insufficient, for during his defense he testified that he did not
possess such a permit. Consequently, we reserve our discussion
of the State's failure to present such evidence during its casein-chief to Smith's ineffectiveness argument.

^26 Smith also claims the evidence was insufficient to establish
that he used a concealed firearm in the commission of a crime of
violence because the pistol became unconcealed during the
aggravated assauLt. The plain language of the statute does not
require that the commission of the crime be contemporaneous with
the concealment of the weapon. Nor does Smith present case law,
either from Utah or elsewhere, to support such a proposition.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error in
refusing to set aside the verdict on this basis.
IV. Plain Error
^27 Smith next claims that the trial court committed plain error
in failing to instruct the jury that threatening with a dangerous
weapon, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506, is a lesser
included offense of aggravated assault. To establish plain
error, Smith must show that "(i) an error was made; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more
favorable outcome was reasonably likely." Helmick, 2000 UT 70 at

19.
1)28 Smith relies on State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984),
to support his claim of plain error. In Oldroyd, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the defendant's use of a weapon could
have constituted either aggravated assault or threatening with a
dangerous weapon and that the failure of the trial court to
instruct the jury on this lesser included offense, after the
defendant requested such an instruction, was reversible error.
See id. at 554-56.
1J29 Smith's reliance upon Oldrovd is misplaced. In Oldroyd, the
defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the
crime of threatening with a dangerous weapon because the evidence
at trial supported such an instruction. See id at 553. In
contrast, Smith never requested such an instruction and
maintained his innocence throughout the trial. Smith's defense
was that he was unable to comply with the deputies' request to
surrender his weapon because he received conflicting instructions
as to how to surrender the weapon.
^30 In light of a claim of total innocence, it was not plain
error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the
lesser included crime of threatening with a dangerous weapon when
there was no request to do so by either party. "[A]n accused may
choose not to request instructions on lesser included offenses as
a matter of trial strategy, usually in the belief that he can
defeat the greater charge, but might not be able to defeat a
lesser included offense." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah
1982). Smith and his trial counsel could have made a reasonable
strategic decision not to instruct the jury on the crime of
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threatening with a dangerous weapon out of fear that the jury
might convict Smith of that crime if it was not able to agree
that he was guilty of aggravated assault.5 Thus, the trial court
did not err in failing to give this instruction.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel6
f31 Smith claims that his counsel was ineffective because he did
not request a dismissal of the concealed weapon charge after the
State failed to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief that
Smith did not have a concealed weapon permit. "To show
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness[,] and (2) that but for
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different."
Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,1119, 61 P.3d 978 (quotations and
citations omitted) .

5. Smith also raises the failure to request an instruction on a
lesser included offense as grounds for finding his trial counsel
ineffective. However, when omitting an instruction appears to be
a matter of trial strategy, it will not be a basis for finding
trial counsel ineffective. Cf. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627,
635-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting an ineffectiveness claim
failed because defendant could not disprove that omission of the
jury instruction was a "conscious trial strategy").
6. While Smith was represented by counsel at his trial, he took
a very active role in his own representation. For example, the
trial court allowed Smith to conduct direct and crossexaminations of witnesses and to present argument to the court.
The trial court's decision to allow Smith to have counsel and yet
appear to represent himself (on several occasions throughout the
proceedings, Smith claimed he was acting either as co-counsel or
pro se) is in conflict with our jurisprudence. See State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,1J15, 979 P. 2d 799 (noting that the right to
represent oneself and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are
"mutually exclusive rights"). After reviewing the record, we
conclude that Smith's active participation in his own defense
frustrated the judicial process. See id. at 1Jl7 (noting that
" [a] criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly
procedures, to choose between waiver [of counsel] and another
course of action"(quotations and citations omitted)(second
alteration in original)). We strongly caution trial courts from
allowing defendants to represent themselves and have counsel, for
it creates a situation where a defendant may both represent
himself at trial and argue ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal.

t32 Pursuant to both section 76-10-504(1)(b)7 and jury
instruction #13D, the State was required to prove that Smith did
not have a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon. However, in
its case-in-chief, the State presented no evidence that Smith
lacked such a permit. The State's failure to present evidence to
satisfy this necessary element of the offense would have entitled
Smith to a dismissal on that count. See, e.g., State v.
Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,1(8, 988 P.2d 949, cert denied, 4 P.3d
1289 ("If the prosecution has failed to present sufficient
evidence to support its case, the trial court should dismiss.").
1(33 Trial counsel f s failure to argue this lack of evidence after
the State rested does not appear to have served a tactical
purpose at trial; nor has the State offered a possible tactical
purpose on appeal. "When no possible explanation or tactical
reason exists for such a decision, we have held that the first
part of the [ineffective assistance of counsel] test is
satisfied." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,^24 (citation omitted). We
conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of
evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is "so deficient
as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Wickham, 2002 UT 72 at ^19.
1|34 Moreover, we conclude that "but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would have been different." Id. (quotation and
citation omitted). Had trial counsel raised this lack of
evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court
would have dismissed the concealed weapon charge. Cf. Kihlstrom,
1999 UT App 289 at: f8.
K3 5 The State argues that even had Smith's counsel moved for a
directed verdict based on a lack of evidence, the State could
have "properly and with little difficulty . . . moved to reopen
and supply the missing evidence." State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah

7.

Section 76-10-504 provides
[A] person without a valid concealed firearm
permit who carries a concealed dangerous
weapon which is a firearm and that contains
no ammunition is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.

If the concealed firearm is used in the
commission of a crime of violence . . . and
the person is a party to the offense, the
person is guilty of a second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann § 76-10-504 (1) (b) , (3) (1999).
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323, 234 P.2d 600, 601 (1951). We are unconvinced. A trial
court has discretionary authority to determine whether to reopen
a case to admit additional evidence. See State v. Duncan, 102
Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (1942). Here, where the State
obviously failed to introduce a necessary element of the crime,
we are not convinced that the trial court would have necessarily
allowed the State to reopen its case and supply the missing
evidence. Accordingly, because of trial counsel's ineffective
assistance related to this single charge, we reverse Smith's
conviction for second-degree concealment of a dangerous weapon
and remand for a new trial on that count.8

8. Remanding for a new trial on this count does not violate the
tenets of double jeopardy, because we reverse Smith's conviction
for "trial error" and not for insufficiency of the evidence.
"[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished
from evidentiary insufficiency, does not
constitute a decision to the effect that the
government has failed to prove its case. As
such, it implies nothing with respect to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather,
it is a determination that a defendant has
been convicted through a judicial process
which is defective in some fundamental
respect."
State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 347 (Utah 1980) (alterations in
original) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.
Ct. 2141, 2149 (1978)).
In State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996), the Utah
Supreme Court excluded all evidence erroneously admitted at
trial, see id. at 550, and concluded that without the evidence,
the state had failed to prove "an essential element of the
charge." Id. The court then reversed and remanded for a new
trial on that count. See id. at 551. Relying upon Lamorie, 610
P.2d at 347, the court stated:
The court in Lamorie held, as we do here,
that the prosecution failed to prove an
essential element of the charge. The court
remanded for a new trial after reversing the
conviction, holding that doing so does not
place the accused in double jeopardy because
the error giving rise to the reversal, i.e.,
the trial court's erroneous introduction of
evidence, was "trial error" as distinguished
from insufficiency of the evidence.
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 550 (citations omitted).
Here, the basis for our reversal is that Smith was deprived
of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
a determination that implies nothing regarding Smith's guilt or
innocence. Rather, our conclusion that Smith's trial counsel was
(continued...)
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CONCLUSION
1f36 The trial court did not deny Smith his Sixth Amendment right
to call witnesses, or to confront witnesses against him. The
evidence was sufficient to convict Smith for aggravated assault,
carrying a concealed weapon in the second degree, and resisting a
lawful arrest. The trial court properly denied Smith's request
to merge the aggravated assault charges into the second-degree
concealed weapon charge. It was not error for the trial court to
fail to instruct on a lesser included offense nor was trial
counsel ineffective for not demanding such an instruction.
^37 However, we conclude that Smith's trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to move for a directed verdict after the
State failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a
valid concealed weapon permit during its case in chief.
Accordingly, we affirm Smith's convictions for aggravated assault
and resisting a lawful arrest, but reverse and remand Smith's
conviction for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon for a new
trial.

William A. Thome Jr. f Judge

^[3 8 WE CONCUR:

8. (...continued)
ineffective speaks to an "error in the trial process and . . .
not an error in judgment concerning the quantum of evidence
needed to convict and sentence." See State v. Palmer, 600 N.W.2d
756, 780 (Neb. 1999) (Connolly, J., concurring), cert denied, 528
U.S. 1192, 120 S. Ct. 1248 (2000). Thus, the error giving rise
to the reversal in this case is trial error and remanding for a
new trial does not violate double jeopardy.
qqn?^£-rA
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